Why Bayesian psychology is incomplete

被引:19
作者
Döring, F [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cincinnati, Dept Philosophy, Cincinnati, OH 45221 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/392739
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
Bayesian psychology, in what is perhaps its most familiar version, is incomplete: Jeffrey conditionalization is not a complete account of rational belief change. Jeffrey conditionalization is sensitive to the order in which the evidence arrives. This order effect can be so pronounced as to call for a belief adjustment that cannot be understood as an assimilation of incoming evidence by Jeffrey's rule. Hartry Field's reparameterization of Jeffrey's rule avoids the order effect but fails as an account of how new evidence should be assimilated.
引用
收藏
页码:S379 / S389
页数:11
相关论文
共 8 条
[1]  
Boutilier C., 1995, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, V36, P158, DOI 10.1305/ndjfl/1040308833
[2]   UPDATING SUBJECTIVE-PROBABILITY [J].
DIACONIS, P ;
ZABELL, SL .
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, 1982, 77 (380) :822-830
[3]   NOTE ON JEFFREY CONDITIONALIZATION [J].
FIELD, H .
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 1978, 45 (03) :361-367
[4]   FIELD AND JEFFREY CONDITIONALIZATION - DISCUSSION [J].
GARBER, D .
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 1980, 47 (01) :142-145
[5]  
Jeffrey R. C, 1983, LOGIC DECISION
[6]  
Jeffrey R. C., 1988, Conditioning, kinematics, and exchangeability, V1, P221
[7]  
SAHFER G, 1976, MATH THEORY EVIDENCE
[8]   JEFFREY RULE OF CONDITIONING [J].
SHAFER, G .
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 1981, 48 (03) :337-362