Manipulation in political stock markets - preconditions and evidence

被引：33

作者：

Hansen, J

Schmidt, C

Strobel, M

机构：

[1] Humboldt Univ, Inst Publ Econ, D-10178 Berlin, Germany

[2] Max Planck Inst Res Econ Syst, Strateg Interact Grp, D-07745 Jena, Germany

[3] Int Inst Infonom, NL-6401 DC Heerlen, Netherlands

来源：

APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2004年 / 11卷 / 07期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1080/1350485042000191700

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion polls. On the bases of a behavioural model, specific preconditions were drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM during the Berlin 1999 state elections.

引用

页码：459 / 463

页数：5

共 10 条

[1]

Barzel Y., 1973, PUBLIC CHOICE, V16, P51, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF01718806

[2]

BERLEMANN M, 2001, 373 HUMB U

[3] Political stock markets and unreliable polls [J].