Physicalism, functionalism and conscious thought

被引：2

作者：

Schweizer, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV EDINBURGH,CTR COGNIT SCI,EDINBURGH EH8 9LW,MIDLOTHIAN,SCOTLAND

来源：

MINDS AND MACHINES | 1996年 / 6卷 / 01期

关键词：

consciousness; qualia; physicalism; functionalism; mental content; intentionality; secondary qualities;

D O I：

10.1007/BF00388918

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

In this paper, I provide further elaboration of my theory of conscious experience, in response to the criticisms made by David Cole, and I directly address a number of the issues he raises. In particular, I examine Cole's claim that functionalism rather than neurophysiology is the theoretical key to consciousness. I argue that weak type-physicalism provides an analysis which is more fine grained, makes weaker assumptions, and allows more scope for empirical methods.

引用

页码：61 / 87

页数：27