CEO cash compensation determinants: an empirical examination of US airlines

被引：4

作者：

Gu, Zheng ^{[2
]}

Kim, Hyunjoon ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Dong A Univ, Coll Business Adm, Pusan, South Korea

[2] Univ Nevada, Coll Hotel Adm, Las Vegas, NV 89154 USA

来源：

SERVICE INDUSTRIES JOURNAL | 2009年 / 29卷 / 07期

关键词：

chief executive officer; cash compensation; determinants; US airlines; agency problem; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; AGENCY COSTS; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; PAY; MATTER; RISK;

D O I：

10.1080/02642060902749823

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This study empirically investigated the determinants of cash compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) for US airlines in the post-9.11 period. After an analysis of 53 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2004, we found that the airline CEO cash compensation was positively correlated with the size and revenue efficiency of an airline firm whereas growth, debt use, profitability, and stock performance were irrelevant to the compensation. Larger airlines with better revenue-generating ability tended to offer high cash compensation to their CEOs. Our findings suggest that the pay-for-performance principle has yet to be fully implemented in the airlines industry. To minimize agency problems and enhance the firm value of US airlines, CEO compensation should be based not only on revenue efficiency but also on profitability and stock performance.

引用

页码：995 / 1005

页数：11

共 41 条

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[2]

AGARWAL A, 1991, FINANC MANAGE, V20, P113

[3] DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION [J].