Wittgenstein and Moore: On Certainty

In this essay I will present an analysis of the response provided by George Edward Moore to the question of the skeptic concerning the doubt surrounding the existence of objects outside us. In the first step an analysis of the answer offered by Moore and its structure is present. In the second step I investigate Moore's capacity of answering the skeptical doubt. After these analyses, my endeavor is to critically consider Moore's answers from the point of view of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, as exposed in his work On Certainty. My conclusion is that the propositions presented by Moore do not serve as evidence to prove the existence of the external world, since those propositions are not derived from empirical investigations. Thus, the alleged Moore's propositions are in fact the structures that allow us to launch our doubts and investigations. From this investigation I examine if Moore's propositions can be considered knowledge. Finally, I analyze the philosophical status of skeptical doubt that Moore intends to respond. My intention here is to show that the skeptical doubt has no sense, and for that reason has the aspect of a paradox. My final conclusion is that the analysis of philosophical skepticism, as designed by Moore and Wittgenstein, enables us to achieve clarity on the set of propositions that are part of the system where the doubts and inquiries have sense.