Stable marriages and search frictions

被引：18
作者：
Lauermann, Stephan [1 ]
Noeldeke, Georg [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Michigan, Dept Econ, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Univ Basel, Fac Business & Econ, CH-4003 Basel, Switzerland
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2014年 / 151卷
关键词：
Marriage market; Nontransferable utility; Stable matchings; Search frictions; 2-SIDED SEARCH; MATCHINGS; STABILITY; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.001
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Stable matchings are the primary solution concept for two-sided matching markets with nontransferable utility. We investigate the strategic foundations of stability in a decentralized matching market. Towards this end, we embed the standard marriage markets in a search model with random meetings. We study the limit of steady-state equilibria as exogenous frictions vanish. The main result is that convergence of equilibrium matchings to stable matchings is guaranteed if and only if there is a unique stable matching in the underlying marriage market. Whenever there are multiple stable matchings, sequences of equilibrium matchings converging to unstable, inefficient matchings can be constructed. Thus, vanishing frictions do not guarantee the stability and efficiency of decentralized marriage markets. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：163 / 195
页数：33
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