Parkinson's law and the new public management? Contracting determinants and service-quality consequences in public education

被引:76
作者
O'Toole, LJ [1 ]
Meier, KJ
机构
[1] Univ Georgia, Dept Publ Adm & Policy, Sch Publ & Int Affairs, Athens, GA 30602 USA
[2] Texas A&M Univ, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00378.x
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
Why is contracting used more frequently under some circumstances than others? What is its impact on spending for core mission and on service quality? These questions are explored with data from more than 1,000 Texas school districts. The evidence for a recent three-year period shows that contracting is negatively related to spending on school districts' central task and is not positively associated with district performance. Why, then, do districts contract? While several variables are associated with the degree of contracting, the most interesting is the relative size of a district's bureaucratic staff. Furthermore, the relationship between contracting and bureaucracy is reciprocal: Each is associated with subsequent growth in the other The dynamic suggests an updated version of Parkinson's law These findings indicate the need for researchers to probe the causes and consequences of contracting more thoroughly to help public managers assess this important option.
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页码:342 / 352
页数:11
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