THE ACT OF INTENTION AS TOPIC OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

The essay investigates the subject of functioning intentionality, as a fundamental feature of Husserl's trascendental phenomenology. After pointing out the limits of Brentano's notion of intentionality, the essay examines the relation between the structure of functioning intentionality and the constitutive analyses, that determine the genetic character of Husserl's phenomenology. With reference to the constitutive themes of intentionality, the article tries to clarify that the intentionality's mode of being require an analytic explication of transcendental subjectivity, so that the intentional analysis shows a certain consonance with psychoanalysis and with the problem of unconscious. The discovery of functioning intentionality, due to phenomenological reduction, allows to reach a further meaning of the subjectivity's life, with the outcome of highlighting that latent intentionality precedes the intentionality of act in a foundational sense.