Limited Consequences of a Transition From Activity-Based Financing to Budgeting: Four Reasons Why According to Swedish Hospital Managers

被引:4
作者
Ellegard, Lina Maria [1 ]
Glenngard, Anna Hager [1 ]
机构
[1] Lund Univ, Lund, Sweden
基金
瑞典研究理事会;
关键词
activity-based financing; budgets; health care managers; health care delivery; qualitative research; Sweden; PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE; HEALTH-CARE; CONTROL-SYSTEMS; PAYMENT; REIMBURSEMENT; INCENTIVES; AUTONOMY; QUALITY;
D O I
10.1177/0046958019838367
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
Activity-based financing (ABF) and global budgeting are two common reimbursement models in hospital care that embody different incentives for cost containment and quality. The purpose of this study was to explore and describe perceptions from the provider perspective about how and why replacing variable ABF by global budgets affects daily operations and provided services. The study setting is a large Swedish county council that went from traditional budgeting to an ABF system and then back again in the period 2005-2012. Based on semistructured interviews with midlevel managers and analysis of administrative data, we conclude that the transition back from ABF to budgeting has had limited consequences and suggest 4 reasons why: (1) Midlevel managers dampen effects of changes in the external control; (2) the actual design of the different reimbursement models differed from the textbook design; (3) the purchasing body's use of other management controls did not change; (4) incentives bypassing the purchasing body's controls dampened the consequences. The study highlights the challenges associated with improvement strategies that rely exclusively on budget system changes within traditional tax-funded and politically managed health care systems.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 10
页数:10
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