Sequencing R&D decisions in a two-period duopoly with spillovers

被引：44

作者：

Amir, M

Amir, R ^{[1
]}

Jin, J

机构：

[1] Univ So Denmark, Dept Econ, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark

[2] King Saud Univ, Dept Stat & Operat Res, Riyadh 11451, Saudi Arabia

[3] Queens Univ Belfast, Dept Econ, Belfast BT7 1NN, Antrim, North Ireland

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2000年 / 15卷 / 02期

关键词：

R&D spillovers; Cournot duopoly; subgame-perfect equilibrium; endogenous timing;

D O I：

10.1007/s001990050014

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We compare simultaneous versus sequential moves in R&D decisions within an asymmetric R&D/Cournot model with linear demand (for differentiated products), general R&D costs, and spillovers. Simultaneous play and sequential play (with and without a specified leader) can emerge as appropriate formulations, depending on the ratios of spillover rate over demand cross-slope, but not on R&D efficiency. When at least one ratio is above 1/2, a sequential solution mitigates competition and leads to higher profits for each firm, and to higher social welfare. When uniquely specified, the stronger firm emerges as the R&D first-mover.

引用

页码：297 / 317

页数：21

共 27 条

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