Sequencing R&D decisions in a two-period duopoly with spillovers

被引:44
作者
Amir, M
Amir, R [1 ]
Jin, J
机构
[1] Univ So Denmark, Dept Econ, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
[2] King Saud Univ, Dept Stat & Operat Res, Riyadh 11451, Saudi Arabia
[3] Queens Univ Belfast, Dept Econ, Belfast BT7 1NN, Antrim, North Ireland
关键词
R&D spillovers; Cournot duopoly; subgame-perfect equilibrium; endogenous timing;
D O I
10.1007/s001990050014
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We compare simultaneous versus sequential moves in R&D decisions within an asymmetric R&D/Cournot model with linear demand (for differentiated products), general R&D costs, and spillovers. Simultaneous play and sequential play (with and without a specified leader) can emerge as appropriate formulations, depending on the ratios of spillover rate over demand cross-slope, but not on R&D efficiency. When at least one ratio is above 1/2, a sequential solution mitigates competition and leads to higher profits for each firm, and to higher social welfare. When uniquely specified, the stronger firm emerges as the R&D first-mover.
引用
收藏
页码:297 / 317
页数:21
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