Tournament Theory: Thirty Years of Contests and Competitions

被引:250
作者
Connelly, Brian L. [1 ]
Tihanyi, Laszlo [2 ]
Crook, T. Russell [3 ]
Gangloff, K. Ashley [1 ]
机构
[1] Auburn Univ, Auburn, AL 36849 USA
[2] Texas A&M Univ, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
[3] Univ Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA
关键词
compensation; bonuses and benefits; franchising; promotion systems; innovation management; industrial economics; RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS; TOP MANAGEMENT; PAY DISPERSION; INNOVATION CONTESTS; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; CEO COMPENSATION; WAGE DISPERSION; SALES CONTESTS; RISK-TAKING;
D O I
10.1177/0149206313498902
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Tournament theory is useful for describing behavior when reward structures are based on relative rank rather than absolute levels of output. Accordingly, management scholars have used tournament theory to describe a wide range of inter- and intraorganizational competitions, such as promotion contests, innovation contests, and competition among franchisees. While the use of tournament theory has gained considerable momentum in recent years, the ideas that underlie the theory have become blurred and potentially useful insights remain trapped within disciplines. We, therefore, provide a synthesis of the theory's foundational concepts, review its use in the management literature, identify advancements from related disciplines that may be imported to management research, and delineate the steps likely to be critical to moving the theory forward. Our hope is this review will make tournament theory more accessible and salient to management researchers with a view toward developing more nuanced versions of the theory and applying it in a wider range of contexts.
引用
收藏
页码:16 / 47
页数:32
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