A Pimp's Game: A Rational Choice Approach to Understanding the Decisions of Sex Traffickers

We employ a rational choice framework to understand the conditions under which sex traffickers allow their victims access to telecommunications devices while under their control. We posit that sex traffickers are rational actors who make calculated decisions regarding whether to allow their victims access to the Internet and cell phones. We hypothesize that sex traffickers allow younger victims and those they did not defraud in the recruitment process greater access to telecommunications devices because these decisions maximize their payoffs with minimal risk. However, we hypothesize that younger victims' access to telecommunications devices is conditional on whether they have been defrauded in recruitment. In order to test these hypotheses, we deployed a survey to 115 victims of sex trafficking in the United States to learn about how they were recruited by their sex trafficker and the level of access they had to technology while under their sex trafficker's control. We find support for all of our hypotheses. The results have serious implications for criminal justice policy and practice.