Maximal stable sets of two-player games

被引：11
作者：
Govindan, S [1 ]
Wilson, R
机构：
[1] Univ Western Ontario, Dept Econ, London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada
[2] Stanford Univ, Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2002年 / 30卷 / 04期
关键词：
perfect equilibria; stable sets;
D O I：
10.1007/s001820200098
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
If a connected component of perfect equilibria of a two-player game contains a stable set as defined by Mertens, then the component is itself stable. Thus the stable sets maximal under inclusion are connected components of perfect equilibria.
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页码：557 / 566
页数：10
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