Optimal incentive contracts for dual asymmetric information

被引：0

作者：

Wei Guangxing ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Chongqing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Management, Chongqing 400074, Peoples R China

来源：

Proceedings of 2005 International Conference on Innovation & Management | 2005年

关键词：

adverse selection; contract theory; moral hazard; optimal incentives;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

The principal usually neither knows the behavior nor the ability of agents, which is defined as dual asymmetric information. So the incentive contracts the principal designs should meet both the moral hazard and the adverse selection incentive compatibility besides the participation constraint. This paper tries to get such a linear contract. This paper explores the optimal incentive contracts for pure moral hazard and dual asymmetric information of incentive.

引用

页码：1012 / 1017

页数：6