You can't 'fake it till you make it': Cooperative motivation does not help proself trustees

被引:1
作者
Acar-Burkay, Sinem [1 ]
Schei, Vidar [2 ]
Beersma, Bianca [3 ]
Warlop, Luk [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ South Eastern Norway, Kongsberg, Norway
[2] NHH Norwegian Sch Econ, Bergen, Norway
[3] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[4] BI Norwegian Business Sch, Oslo, Norway
关键词
Trust; Social motives; Social value orientation; Motivational orientation;
D O I
10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104078
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Cooperative motivation can be rooted in individual differences as well as in external factors, such as instructions from superiors, incentive schemes, policy agendas, or social relationships. Whereas cooperative motivation has generally been found to increase trust, in five studies conducted across different contexts (scenario-based, online with monetary consequences that were contingent on participants' decisions, in-class and laboratory face-to face negotiations), convergent evidence was found showing that trustees were trusted more when they were externally motivated to act cooperatively (vs. individualistically), though only when they already had a prosocial (vs. proself) social value orientation - i.e., internally driven positive care for others' (vs. their own) well-being. This finding was observed even when trustors had no explicit information about whether or how trustees were motivated by internal or external factors. The mediation analyses indicate that this effect is driven by trustors' perceptions of trustees' authenticity. Taken together, insight into how trustees' personalities and situations interact in predicting the level of trust granted to them is provided.
引用
收藏
页数:13
相关论文
共 56 条
  • [1] The Best of Both Worlds? Negotiations Between Cooperators and Individualists Provide High Economic and Relational Outcomes
    Acar-Burkay, Sinem
    Schei, Vidar
    Warlop, Luk
    [J]. GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION, 2020, 29 (03) : 491 - 522
  • [2] Trusting Others: The Polarization Effect of Need for Closure
    Acar-Burkay, Sinem
    Fennis, Bob M.
    Warlop, Luk
    [J]. JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2014, 107 (04) : 719 - 735
  • [3] HALF A MINUTE - PREDICTING TEACHER EVALUATIONS FROM THIN SLICES OF NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR AND PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS
    AMBADY, N
    ROSENTHAL, R
    [J]. JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1993, 64 (03) : 431 - 441
  • [4] A Note on Dropping Experimental Subjects who Fail a Manipulation Check
    Aronow, Peter M.
    Baron, Jonathon
    Pinson, Lauren
    [J]. POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 2019, 27 (04) : 572 - 589
  • [5] Baumeister R. F., 2001, REV GEN PSYCHOL, V5, P323, DOI [DOI 10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323, 10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323]
  • [6] RESISTANCE TO YIELDING AND THE EXPECTATION OF COOPERATIVE FUTURE INTERACTION IN NEGOTIATION
    BENYOAV, O
    PRUITT, DG
    [J]. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1984, 20 (04) : 323 - 335
  • [7] TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND SOCIAL-HISTORY
    BERG, J
    DICKHAUT, J
    MCCABE, K
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1995, 10 (01) : 122 - 142
  • [8] Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not
    Bicchieri, Cristina
    Xiao, Erte
    Muldoon, Ryan
    [J]. POLITICS PHILOSOPHY & ECONOMICS, 2011, 10 (02) : 170 - 187
  • [9] Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game
    Burnham, T
    McCabe, K
    Smith, VL
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2000, 43 (01) : 57 - 73
  • [10] THE RIGHT AMOUNT OF TRUST
    Butler, Jeffrey V.
    Giuliano, Paola
    Guiso, Luigi
    [J]. JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2016, 14 (05) : 1155 - 1180