Political economy of crime and punishment under Stalin

被引：11

作者：

Belova, Eugenia ^{[2
]}

Gregory, Paul ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Houston, Dept Econ, Houston, TX 77204 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Hoover Inst, Stanford, CA USA

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2009年 / 140卷 / 3-4期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Economics of crime; Comparative economics; Dictatorship; Socialism; ENFORCEMENT; MARKET; LAW;

D O I：

10.1007/s11127-009-9430-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Why do dictatorships favor harsher punishments than democracies? We use a rational choice approach to explain the stylized facts of Stalin's dictatorship-preference for harsh sanctions, higher incarceration rates, greater use of capital punishment, low tolerance for theft of state property and workplace violations. They are shown to be explained by the preferences of a rational dictator, who does not internalize the social and private cost of punishment.

引用

页码：463 / 478

页数：16

共 33 条

[1] The aggregate burden of crime [J].