Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance

被引：9
|
作者：
Dosis, Anastasios [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] ESSEC Business Sch, Dept Econ, 3 Ave Bernard Hirsch, F-95021 Cergy Pontoise, France
[2] THEMA, 3 Ave Bernard Hirsch, F-95021 Cergy Pontoise, France
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2017年 / 152卷
关键词：
Insurance; Adverse selection; Duopoly; Contracts; Nash equilibrium; DISCONTINUOUS ECONOMIC GAMES; ADVERSE SELECTION; MARKETS; INFORMATION; EXISTENCE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.030
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
I formalize a rather stylized insurance market with adverse selection as a standard duopoly. I formally specify demand functions and profits and prove that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation is efficient. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：5 / 8
页数：4
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