Market coupling and the importance of price coordination between power exchanges

被引:36
作者
Meeus, L. [1 ]
Vandezande, L. [1 ]
Cole, S. [1 ]
Belmans, R. [1 ]
机构
[1] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Univ Leuven, Elect Engn Branch, Energy Inst, B-3001 Louvain, Belgium
关键词
Pricing; Electric market equilibrium; Operational research; Power system economics; Duality;
D O I
10.1016/j.energy.2008.04.013
中图分类号
O414.1 [热力学];
学科分类号
摘要
In Europe, market coupling stands for a further integration of wholesale trading arrangements across country borders. More specifically, it refers to the implicit auctioning of cross-border physical transmission rights via the hourly auctions for electric energy organized by power exchanges (PEXs) one day ahead of delivery. It therefore implies that the PEXs can optimize the clearing of their day-ahead auctions. Due to verticals in the aggregated order curves, the optimal solution can be settled at different prices. In order for prices to give correct locational signals for network development, generation and consumption, price coordination between exchanges is necessary. The paper illustrates this issue, its relevance and discusses how to deal with it. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:228 / 234
页数:7
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