Re-construction of action awareness depends on an internal model of action-outcome timing

被引:2
作者
Stenner, Max-Philipp [1 ,2 ]
Bauer, Markus [1 ]
Machts, Judith [4 ]
Heinze, Hans-Jochen [2 ]
Haggard, Patrick [3 ]
Dolan, Raymond J. [1 ]
机构
[1] UCL, Wellcome Trust Ctr Neuroimaging, London WC1N 3BG, England
[2] Univ Magdeburg, Dept Neurol, D-39120 Magdeburg, Germany
[3] UCL, Inst Cognit Neurosci, London WC1N 3AR, England
[4] German Ctr Neurodegenerat Dis, D-39120 Magdeburg, Germany
基金
英国惠康基金;
关键词
Action awareness; Temporal binding; Sense of agency; PREDICTION; BINDING;
D O I
10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.007
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The subjective time of an instrumental action is shifted towards its outcome. This temporal binding effect is partially retrospective, i.e., occurs upon outcome perception. Retrospective binding is thought to reflect post-hoc inference on agency based on sensory evidence of the action - outcome association. However, many previous binding paradigms cannot exclude the possibility that retrospective binding results from bottom-up interference of sensory outcome processing with action awareness and is functionally unrelated to the processing of the action - outcome association. Here, we keep bottom-up interference constant and use a contextual manipulation instead. We demonstrate a shift of subjective action time by its outcome in a context of variable outcome timing. Crucially, this shift is absent when there is no such variability. Thus, retrospective action binding reflects a context-dependent, model-based phenomenon. Such top-down re-construction of action awareness seems to bias agency attribution when outcome predictability is low. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.orgflicenses/by/3.0/).
引用
收藏
页码:11 / 16
页数:6
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