On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles

被引:10
|
作者
Chen, Jiehua [1 ,2 ]
Finnendahl, Ugo P. [1 ]
机构
[1] TU Berlin, Inst Softwaretech & Theoret Informat, Berlin, Germany
[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Ind Engn & Management, POB 653, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
Narcissistic preferences; Single-peaked preferences; Single-crossing preferences; Semi-standard Young tableaux;
D O I
10.1016/j.disc.2018.01.008
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
We investigate preference profiles for a set v of voters, where each voter i has a preference order >(i); on a finite set A of alternatives (that is, a linear order on A) such that for each two alternatives a, b is an element of A, voter i prefers a to 6 if a>(i)b. Such a profile is narcissistic if each alternative a is preferred the most by at least one voter. It is single-peaked if there is a linear order (sic)(SP) on the alternatives such that each voter's preferences on the alternatives along the order (sic)(SP) are either strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or first strictly increasing and then strictly decreasing. It is single-crossing if there is a linear order (sic)(SP) on the voters such that each pair of alternatives divides the order (sic)(SP) into at most two suborders, where in each suborder, all voters have the same linear order on this pair. We show that for n voters and n alternatives, the number of single-peaked narcissistic profiles is Pi(n-1)(i=2)((n-1)(i-1)) while the number of single-crossing narcissistic profiles is 2((n-1)(2)). (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1225 / 1236
页数:12
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