The political determinants of executive compensation: Evidence from an emerging economy

被引：14
作者：
Liang, Hao [1 ]
Renneboog, Luc [1 ]
Sun, Sunny Li [2 ]
机构：
[1] Tilburg Univ, Dept Finance, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[2] Univ Missouri, Bloch Sch Management, Kansas City, MO USA
来源：
EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW | 2015年 / 25卷
关键词：
Executive compensation; Political economy; State ownership; Market friction; SHARE STRUCTURE REFORM; CEO COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP; PAY; STATE; PERFORMANCE; PRIVATIZATION; INSTITUTIONS; SENSITIVITY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ememar.2015.04.008
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
In regulated economies, corporate governance mechanisms such as executive compensation are less driven by market-based forces but more subject to political influence. We study the political determinants of executive compensation for all listed Chinese firms in the context of an exogenous shock that removed market frictions in share-tradability. Under strong political constraints, state ownership reduced the managerial pay levels and increased pay-for-performance sensitivity (to asset-based benchmarks). Board independence and compensation committees do not curb managerial pay, and market-based factors do not have a significant influence. However, these effects reversed following the governance shock (removal of market frictions in share tradability). (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：69 / 91
页数：23
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