We examine the competition between a group of Internet retailers who operate in an environment where a price search engine plays a dominant role. We show that for some products in this environment, the easy price search makes demand tremendously price-sensitive. Retailers, though, engage in obfuscation-practices that frustrate consumer search or make it less damaging to firms-resulting in much less price sensitivity on some other products. We discuss several models of obfuscation and examine its effects on demand and markups empirically.
机构:
Univ Helsinki, Fac Social Sci, Discipline Econ, POB 17, FIN-00014 Helsinki, FinlandUniv Helsinki, Fac Social Sci, Discipline Econ, POB 17, FIN-00014 Helsinki, Finland
机构:
Univ Chicago, Kenneth C Griffin Dept Econ, 1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAUniv Chicago, Kenneth C Griffin Dept Econ, 1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
Dinerstein, Michael
Einav, Liran
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NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 USAUniv Chicago, Kenneth C Griffin Dept Econ, 1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
Einav, Liran
Levin, Jonathan
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NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 USAUniv Chicago, Kenneth C Griffin Dept Econ, 1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
Levin, Jonathan
Sundaresan, Neel
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Microsoft, 1 Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA 98052 USAUniv Chicago, Kenneth C Griffin Dept Econ, 1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA