The ecological compensation mechanism is an effective economic policy for solving resource conflicts, enhancing interest synergies, and achieving environmental sustainability. In the development of the Belt and Road, it is also an essential tool for promoting the cooperative management of international rivers. Therefore, this study discusses the necessity of transboundary ecological compensation and explores how to promote its stable establishment. First, the evolutionary game theory was used to clarify the interaction mechanism between upstream and downstream countries and the supervision commission, which is co-financed by riparian countries. Second, scenario simulation analyses are presented to explore the influence of key parameters on the dynamic evolutionary behaviors of the tripartite game subjects. Based on the above research, we proposed to establish an ecological compensation elastic mechanism and optimize the design of the path. The results showed that: (1) The higher the asymmetry between countries along transboundary rivers, the more difficult it is for ecological compensation projects to be smoothly implemented; (2) supervision is always valid for upstream and downstream countries to comply with the ecological compensation contract as asymmetry varies, especially in shared rivers with high asymmetry; (3) charging liquidated damage for upstream and downstream countries is an effective restraint measure, especially for downstream countries; and (4) there is a marginal diminishing effect on the constraints of downstream countries when the liquidated damage is at a certain high level (i.e., the liquidated damage is higher than the increased water ecological benefits). (C) 2022 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.