Constructive Semantics: On the Necessity of an Appropriate Concept of Schematization

The issue of constructivity in general is by no means new, when it enters the stage of discussions concerning the foundations of mathematics at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially through L. E. J. Brouwer's supposedly radical reformation of the basic elements of mathematics. (The impression of radicalness that Brouwer obviously had on contemporaries expresses itself among others in the political names people chose for Brouwer's intuitionistic endeavour: Weyl called it "the revolution", Hilbert accordingly named it "attempted coup".) The contrary is the case: Since Kant's Critique of Pure Reason with its separation of the faculty of sensibility (receptivity) on the one side from the faculty of the intellect (spontaneity) on the other side, and the interconnected separation of different fields of knowledge, the intuitive-constructive and the discursive realm, (See Sect. 8.1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic for the introduction of the different faculties of knowledge.) a broad engagement with respect to the general form of knowledge, even and in particular of philosophy itself as a theory of knowledge, came into existence. Among others especially G. W. F. Hegel criticized the Kantian approach for its too narrow concept of constructivity. (The idealistic system-designs of Fichte and Schelling of course also comprise a criticism of Kantian thinking.) Along the main lines of Hegel's critique of Kant's limitation of constructivity to intuitive constructivity-schematic construction in pure intuition-and his closely related critique of the non-dialectical methodology of Kantian philosophy in general, we want to open up a discussion of the general form and methodology of constructive semantics as a philosophical endeavour. In this connection it turns out that Kant's idea of the necessary schematization of linguistic concepts into temporal forms of constitution, after having undergone a Hegelian revision, proves to be quite useful for clarifying the problems and challenges of and for constructive philosophy, even today.