The Effect of CEO Ownership on Corporate Social Responsibility

被引:4
|
作者
Meier, Olivier [1 ]
Schier, Guillaume [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Paris Est, LIPHA, Champs Sur Marne, France
[2] ESSCA, Ecole Management, 1 Rue Joseph Lakanal, F-49000 Angers, France
来源
COMPTABILITE CONTROLE AUDIT | 2017年 / 23卷 / 03期
关键词
CSR; CEO OWNERSHIP; ENTRENCHMENT; PRIVATE BENEFITSPOLICIES; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT; EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION; INTANGIBLE RESOURCES; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; FIRMS; GOVERNANCE; DISCLOSURE; BUSINESS; MODELS;
D O I
10.3917/cca.233.0097
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article focuses on CSR as a source of conflicts of interest between CEOs and shareholders. Although CSR may serve shareholder interests in the long run, it may also strengthen CEO entrenchment by promoting coalitions with specific stakeholders, effectively bypassing shareholder interests. We use a sample of 591 listed companies evaluated by the social rating agency VIGEO between 2008 and 2011 (1,405 firmyear observations) to highlight the existence of a non-linear relationship between CEO ownership and CSR. Our results suggest that specific private benefits are associated with CSR and that entrenchment significantly influences CSR, providing evidence that CEOs may effectively be instrumentalizing CSR.
引用
收藏
页码:97 / 134
页数:38
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