Liability and information transmission: The advantage of negligence based rules

被引：9

作者：

Feess, Eberhard ^{[1
]}

Wohschlegel, Ansgar ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Aachen, Dept Microecon, D-52062 Aachen, Germany

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2006年 / 92卷 / 01期

关键词：

liability rules; negligence; rational expectations;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.01.023

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

It is usually taken for granted that strict liability is superior to negligence for unilateral accidents. We show that the contrary holds if some potential injurers and the court have inferior information about expected accident costs, as negligence standards may serve as an information transmission device. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.

引用

页码：63 / 67

页数：5