Higher cognitive ability is associated with lower entries in a p-beauty contest

被引：63

作者：

Burnham, Terence C. ^{[1
]}

Cesarini, David ^{[2
]}

Johannesson, Magnus ^{[3
]}

Lichtenstein, Paul ^{[4
]}

Wallace, Bjorn ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[3] Stockholm Sch Econ, Dept Econ, SE-11383 Stockholm, Sweden

[4] Karolinska Inst, Dept Med Epidemiol & Biostat, SE-17177 Stockholm, Sweden

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2009年 / 72卷 / 01期

关键词：

Cognitive ability; Experimental economics; Beauty contests; Rationality; BEHAVIOR; PREFERENCES; OUTCOMES; GAMES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.015

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

"Beauty contests" are well-studied, dominance-solvable games that generate two interesting results. First, most behavior does not conform to the unique Nash equilibrium. Second, there is considerable unexplained heterogeneity in behavior. In this work, we explore the relationship between beauty contest behavior and cognitive ability. We find that subjects with high cognitive ability exhibit behavior that is closer to the Nash equilibrium. (c) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：171 / 175

页数：5

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