Central Bank transparency

被引:237
作者
Geraats, PM [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1TN, England
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-0297.00082
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Central bank transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy recently. This survey article provides a structured review of the theoretical literature on the consequences of transparency of monetary policy, proposing a distinction between uncertainty and incentive effects of transparency. The theoretical insights are compared to the various ways in which central banks have become transparent in practice. In addition, there is an assessment of the empirical evidence concerning the transparency of monetary policy.
引用
收藏
页码:F532 / F565
页数:34
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