New directions in the philosophy of mind

被引：0

作者：

de Hollanda, Gabriel Juca ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Pontificia Univ Catolica Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

来源：

TRANS-FORM-ACAO | 2013年 / 36卷 / 03期

关键词：

Mind; Neuroscience; Perception; Vision; Explanation;

D O I：

10.1590/S0101-31732013000300010

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Critiques of naturalist/physicalist theories in the philosophy of mind have focused on conceptual problems rooted in qualia and thought experiments. It would seem reasonable to question the validity of such critiques when their targets satisfy what is demanded of a scientific explanation and when their objections employ apparently ad hoc assumptions. The philosophers of mind Tyler Burge and Alva Noe propose new ways of objecting to contemporary neuroscience, without making use of the usual conceptual tools. Their viewpoints stand out for a focus on empirical problems, and at the same time reveal surprising gaps in what physicalists tend to see as the most advanced science of the mind.

引用

页码：173 / 186

页数：14

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