Kant's Conceptualism: a Reading of Judgments of Taste. Reply to my Critics

In this paper, I present a reply to my critics (Silvia Di Sanza, Pedro Stepanenko y Luciana Martinez) to "Kant's (Non)-conceptualism and judgments of taste". My main goal is to defend a conceptualist reading of Kant's theory of judgments of taste. First, I suggest that knowledge in general that appears in the framework of judgments of taste does not imply an absence of concepts. Second, I indicate that without some kind of conceptual activity, it would be impossible to ground the universality of judgments of taste. Third, I affirm that the representational character of judgments of taste does not imply a commitment to non-conceptualism. Finally, I argue that the irreducibility of judgments of taste to a determinate concept does not necessarily carry to non-conceptualism.