Why shared meanings have no place in structuration theory: A reply to Scapens and Macintosh

Scapens & Macintosh [Accounting, Organizations and Society (1996) pp. 675-690] argue that distinguishing between studies at the level of strategic conduct and studies at the level of institutional analysis helps to explain the differences between us. I believe that this distinction is not relevant to the position I took in ''Accounting and the Interpretive Act'', and I offer my own explanation of how we differ in our understanding of structuration theory. I argue that Giddens developed structuration theory to counter Parsons' use of shared meanings and value consensus to explain social order. In place of concensus on values and meanings, structuration theory emphasizes the skilled accomplishment of ''knowing how to go on'' in the temporal flow of situated practice, as described in the writings of Wittgenstein, Goffman and Garfinkel. When Macintosh & Scapens [Accounting, Organizations and Society (1990) pp. 455-477] employed shared values and shared meanings as an explanatory device in their structurational study, either at the individual or the institutional level, they were at odds with this central feature of structuration theory. I end my reply by discussing how studies of strategic conduct are related to studies at the institutional level of analysis, in order to further explore what I believe are the differences in our understanding of Giddens' structuration theory. Copyright (C) 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd