Trust among strangers

被引：27
作者：
Bicchieri, C [1 ]
Duffy, J
Tolle, G
机构：
[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Dept Philosophy, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
[2] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Econ, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
[3] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
来源：
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2004年 / 71卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1086/381411
中图分类号：
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要：
The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a "trust and reciprocate" norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions.
引用
收藏
页码：286 / 319
页数：34
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