Trust among strangers

被引：28

作者：

Bicchieri, C ^{[1
]}

Duffy, J

Tolle, G

机构：

[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Dept Philosophy, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA

[2] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Econ, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

[3] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2004年 / 71卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/381411

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a "trust and reciprocate" norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions.

引用

页码：286 / 319

页数：34

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