Sadism, the Intuitive System, and Antisocial Punishment in the Public Goods Game

被引:40
|
作者
Pfattheicher, Stefan [1 ]
Keller, Johannes [1 ]
Knezevic, Goran [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Ulm, Ulm, Germany
[2] Univ Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
关键词
antisocial punishment; intuition; punishment; sadism; social dilemma; SOCIAL HEURISTICS; COSTLY PUNISHMENT; EVERYDAY SADISM; COOPERATION; SLOW; DILEMMAS; CONFLICT; ALTRUISM;
D O I
10.1177/0146167216684134
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
In public goods situations, a specific destructive behavior emerges when individuals face the possibility of punishing others: antisocial punishment, that is, costly punishing cooperative individuals. So far, little is known about the (intuitive or reflective) processes underlying antisocial punishment. Building on the Social Heuristics Hypothesis and arguing that antisocial punishment reflects the basic characteristics of sadism, namely, aggressive behavior to dominate and to harm other individuals it is assumed that everyday sadists intuitively engage in antisocial punishment. Two studies document that activating (Study 1) and inhibiting (Study 2) the intuitive system when a punishment option can be realized in one-shot iterated public goods games increased (Study 1) and reduced (Study 2) antisocial punishment, in particular among individuals who reported a proneness to sadism. In sum, the present research suggests that sadistic tendencies executed intuitively play a crucial role regarding antisocial punishment in public goods situations.
引用
收藏
页码:337 / 346
页数:10
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