Sadism, the Intuitive System, and Antisocial Punishment in the Public Goods Game

被引:40
|
作者
Pfattheicher, Stefan [1 ]
Keller, Johannes [1 ]
Knezevic, Goran [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Ulm, Ulm, Germany
[2] Univ Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
关键词
antisocial punishment; intuition; punishment; sadism; social dilemma; SOCIAL HEURISTICS; COSTLY PUNISHMENT; EVERYDAY SADISM; COOPERATION; SLOW; DILEMMAS; CONFLICT; ALTRUISM;
D O I
10.1177/0146167216684134
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
In public goods situations, a specific destructive behavior emerges when individuals face the possibility of punishing others: antisocial punishment, that is, costly punishing cooperative individuals. So far, little is known about the (intuitive or reflective) processes underlying antisocial punishment. Building on the Social Heuristics Hypothesis and arguing that antisocial punishment reflects the basic characteristics of sadism, namely, aggressive behavior to dominate and to harm other individuals it is assumed that everyday sadists intuitively engage in antisocial punishment. Two studies document that activating (Study 1) and inhibiting (Study 2) the intuitive system when a punishment option can be realized in one-shot iterated public goods games increased (Study 1) and reduced (Study 2) antisocial punishment, in particular among individuals who reported a proneness to sadism. In sum, the present research suggests that sadistic tendencies executed intuitively play a crucial role regarding antisocial punishment in public goods situations.
引用
收藏
页码:337 / 346
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Punishment in the public goods game is evaluated negatively irrespective of non-cooperators' motivation
    Li, Yang
    Mifune, Nobuhiro
    FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY, 2023, 14
  • [32] Asymmetric network monitoring and punishment in public goods experiments
    Boosey, Luke
    Isaac, R. Mark
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2016, 132 : 26 - 41
  • [33] Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules
    van Miltenburg, Nynke
    Buskens, Vincent
    Barrera, Davide
    Raub, Werner
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS, 2014, 8 (01): : 47 - 78
  • [34] Limited punishment pool may promote cooperation in the public goods game
    Feng, Sinan
    Liu, Xuesong
    Dong, Yida
    CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS, 2022, 165
  • [35] Teams in a public goods experiment with punishment
    Auerswald, Heike
    Schmidt, Carsten
    Thum, Marcel
    Torsvik, Gaute
    JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2018, 72 : 28 - 39
  • [36] The evolution of cooperation in voluntary public goods game with shared-punishment
    Lv, Shaojie
    Li, Jiaying
    Zhao, Changheng
    CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS, 2023, 172
  • [37] Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
    Wang, Shengxian
    Liu, Linjie
    Chen, Xiaojie
    PHYSICS LETTERS A, 2021, 386 (386)
  • [38] Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process
    Quan, Ji
    Liu, Wei
    Chu, Yuqing
    Wang, Xianjia
    SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, 2017, 7
  • [39] Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game
    Yang, Zhi-Hao
    Yang, Yan-Long
    CHINESE PHYSICS B, 2024, 33 (09)
  • [40] Cooperation, punishment, and group change in multilevel public goods experiments
    Otten, Kasper
    Buskens, Vincent
    Przepiorka, Wojtek
    Cherki, Boaz
    Israel, Salomon
    EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2024, 164