On vertical relations and the timing of technology adoption

被引:9
作者
Alipranti, Maria [1 ]
Milliou, Chrysovalantou [2 ]
Petrakis, Emmanuel [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Dusseldorf, DICE, D-40225 Dusseldorf, Germany
[2] Athens Univ Econ & Business, Dept Int & European Econ Studies, Athens 10434, Greece
[3] Univ Crete, Dept Econ, Rethimnon 74100, Greece
关键词
Technology adoption; Vertical relations; Outsourcing; Two-part tariffs; Wholesale price contracts; Bargaining; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; INFORMATION-TECHNOLOGY; MARKET-STRUCTURE; DIFFUSION; INCENTIVES; MERGERS; MANUFACTURERS; INVESTMENT; INNOVATION; CONTRACTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.011
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the timing of new technology adoption in markets with input outsourcing, and thus with vertical relations. We find that technology adoption can take place earlier when firms engage in input outsourcing than when they produce the input in-house. Hence, the presence of vertical relations can accelerate the adoption of a new technology. We also find that particular features of a vertically related market, such as the distribution of bargaining power and the contract type through which trading is conducted, can crucially affect the speed of technology adoption. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:117 / 129
页数:13
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