THE OLD AND NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The aim of this paper is to point out the essential differences in the understanding of character of scientific knowledge within the old and new philosophy of science. The old philosophy of science is founded on doctrines of observationalism and inductivism and centered on the cumulative image of the growth of scientific knowledge. More or less, scientific theories are conceived as true descriptions of relevant experience. This image is completely changed under the influence of the methodological analysis of scientific revolutions. It appeared that: it is impossible to derive theories from experience in an inductive way: that pure experience does not exist -namely, facts (experience) are always interpreted (organized) by some (partly conventional or a priori) referential framework; that possibility of proof in empirical sciences is illusory just as the conclusive falsification of scientific statements; that same facts can be explained by different (mutually inconsistent or incommensurable) theories; that scientific change often is of a revolutionary character, and so on. These methodological facts are the main points of the new philosophy of science, and every approach (among different ones) within that philosophy explains these facts in its own way. However, perceived globally, today scientific theories are conceived much more as constructions of human reason (although strictly dictated by demand for their predictive success) than truths about the world, images of experience (or reality), true descriptions of relevant facts, etc.