Why don't donor countries coordinate their aid? A case study of European donors in Morocco

被引:8
作者
Olivie, Iliana [1 ,2 ]
Perez, Aitor [1 ]
机构
[1] Elcano Royal Inst, Madrid, Spain
[2] Univ Complutense Madrid, E-28040 Madrid, Spain
关键词
European Union; Morocco; aid; development; coordination; FOREIGN-AID; BILATERAL AID; ALLOCATION; PROLIFERATION; POLICY; FRAGMENTATION; DETERMINANTS; HUMANITARIAN; SELECTIVITY; COMPETITION;
D O I
10.1177/1464993415608082
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Lack of coordination among donors poses several problems: it results in higher administrative costs for both donors and partner countries and weakens aid effectiveness. This rationale is the basis for the OECD and EU political agendas on harmonization and coordination, which has resulted in different coordination initiatives at both headquarters and field levels. However, despite the political agenda, recent studies show that for many donors and partner countries aid fragmentation has prevailed or even increased. By means of a country case study in Morocco, this document explores the obstacles to aid coordination in a specific EU development partner country. Coordination initiatives may have proliferated but not necessarily triggered results in terms of joint work or donors' specialization. The main obstacles to coordination include varied administrative procedures; diverse administrative architectures; resistance from local authorities and also from leading donors (to abandon or share flagship aid programmes).
引用
收藏
页码:52 / 64
页数:13
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