Defending Lewis's local miracle compatibilism

被引：9

作者：

Oakley, Shane ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Miami, Dept Philosophy, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2006年 / 130卷 / 02期

关键词：

Actual World; Weak Sense; Strong Ability; Consequence Argument; Weak Ability;

D O I：

10.1007/s11098-004-4677-4

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Helen Beebee has recently argued that David Lewis's account of compatibilism, so-called local miracle compatibilism (LMC), allows for the possibility that agents in deterministic worlds have the ability to break or cause the breaking of a law of nature. Because Lewis's LMC allows for this consequence, Beebee claims that LMC is untenable and subsequently that Lewis's criticism of van Inwagen's Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is substantially weakened. I review Beebee's argument against Lewis's thesis and argue that Beebee has not refuted LMC and concomitantly has not demonstrated that Lewis's criticism of the Consequence Argument fails.

引用

页码：337 / 349

页数：13