False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems-Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey

被引:410
作者
Deng, Ruilong [1 ]
Xiao, Gaoxi [2 ]
Lu, Rongxing [3 ]
Liang, Hao [1 ]
Vasilakos, Athanasios V. [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Alberta, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Edmonton, AB T6G 1H9, Canada
[2] Nanyang Technol Univ, Sch Elect & Elect Engn, Singapore 639798, Singapore
[3] Univ New Brunswick, Fac Comp Sci, Fredericton, NB E3B 5A3, Canada
[4] Lulea Univ Technol, Dept Comp Sci Elect & Space Engn, S-97187 Lulea, Sweden
关键词
Cyber security; electricity market; false data injection (FDI); smart grid; state estimation; CYBER SECURITY; MITIGATION; PROTECTION; ENERGY;
D O I
10.1109/TII.2016.2614396
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The accurately estimated state is of great importance for maintaining a stable running condition of power systems. To maintain the accuracy of the estimated state, bad data detection (BDD) is utilized by power systems to get rid of erroneous measurements due to meter failures or outside attacks. However, false data injection (FDI) attacks, as recently revealed, can circumvent BDD and insert any bias into the value of the estimated state. Continuous works on constructing and/or protecting power systems from such attacks have been done in recent years. This survey comprehensively overviews three major aspects: constructing FDI attacks; impacts of FDI attacks on electricity market; and defending against FDI attacks. Specifically, we first explore the problem of constructing FDI attacks, and further show their associated impacts on electricity market operations, from the adversary's point of view. Then, from the perspective of the system operator, we present countermeasures against FDI attacks. We also outline the future research directions and potential challenges based on the above overview, in the context of FDI attacks, impacts, and defense.
引用
收藏
页码:411 / 423
页数:13
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