Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions

被引:84
作者
Cheung, Yan-Leung [1 ]
Qi, Yuehua [1 ]
Rau, P. Raghavendra [2 ]
Stouraitis, Aris [1 ]
机构
[1] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Purdue Univ, Barclays Global Investors & Krannert Grad Sch Man, MGMT, KRAN, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
关键词
International corporate governance; Expropriation; Related party transactions; Tunneling; INVESTOR PROTECTION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; VOTING-RIGHTS; PROFITABILITY; EXPROPRIATION; SECURITIES; EARNINGS; LAW;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.10.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms' length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998-2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to similar arms' length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms' length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms' length deals. With the exception of audit committees, Corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:914 / 924
页数:11
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