Do banks really monitor? Evidence from CEO succession decisions

被引：17
|
作者：
Marshall, Andrew [1 ]
McCann, Laura [2 ]
McColgan, Patrick [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Strathclyde, Dept Accounting & Finance, Glasgow G4 0LN, Lanark, Scotland
[2] Univ Aberdeen, Sch Business, Aberdeen AB9 1FX, Scotland
来源：
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2014年 / 46卷
关键词：
Bank debt; CEO succession; Lender monitoring; External succession; TOP EXECUTIVE TURNOVER; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; FINANCIAL DISTRESS; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; PUBLIC DEBT; DIRECTORS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.05.017
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We demonstrate that banks play an important monitoring role in CEO succession that is not observed for other types of lenders, particularly public bondholders. There is a stronger relation between cash flow performance and forced CEO turnover for firms issuing bank debt during the year of CEO turnover than for firms not issuing bank debt, and bank debt issuance increases the likelihood of external CEO succession. The stock price reaction to CEO succession is higher when bank monitoring is prevalent. Our results are consistent with theories of relationship banking that propose a valuable monitoring role for well informed, incentivized bank lenders. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：118 / 131
页数：14
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