The New Path to Improve Construction Safety Performance in China: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach

被引:25
作者
Pi, Zongjie [1 ]
Gao, Xin [1 ]
Chen, Linyan [1 ]
Liu, Jinghua [1 ]
机构
[1] Tongji Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Shanghai 200092, Peoples R China
关键词
safety performance; construction industry; evolutionary game; RISK-BASED MANAGEMENT; OCCUPATIONAL-SAFETY; STRATEGIC INTERACTION; BOUNDED RATIONALITY; SCHEME PFSS; CLIMATE; INDUSTRY; HEALTH; INVESTMENT; COMPANY;
D O I
10.3390/ijerph16132443
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Evidence shows that there are many work-related accidents and injuries happening in construction projects and governments have taken a series of administrative measures to reduce casualties in recent years. However, traditional approaches have reached a bottleneck due to ignoring market forces, and thus new measures should be conducted. This study develops a perspective of safety performance (SP) for construction projects in China and puts forward a conception of the safety information system by using several brainstorming sessions to strengthen the safety supervision of participants in the construction industry. This system provides rating information to the public, and bad performance contractors enter into a blacklist which will influence their economic activities. Considering the limited rationality of government and various contractors, this paper builds a reasonable evolutionary game model to verify the feasibility of the safety information system. The analysis results show that there is not a single set of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs), as different situations may lead to different ESSs. The efficiency of applying the safety information system (the blacklist) in the construction industry can be proved by reducing the government's safety supervision cost and by enhancing construction safety at the same time.
引用
收藏
页数:24
相关论文
共 61 条
[1]   AUCTIONS WITH ARTIFICIAL ADAPTIVE AGENTS [J].
ANDREONI, J ;
MILLER, JH .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1995, 10 (01) :39-64
[2]  
Anthony P, 2002, FRONT ARTIF INTEL AP, V77, P178
[3]   Robust optimization in relation to a basic safety investment model with imprecise probabilities [J].
Aven, Terje ;
Hiriart, Yolande .
SAFETY SCIENCE, 2013, 55 :188-194
[4]  
Axelrod R., 1984, The evolution of cooperation
[5]   AN INDIRECT COST THEORY OF WORK ACCIDENT PREVENTION [J].
BRODY, B ;
LETOURNEAU, Y ;
POIRIER, A .
JOURNAL OF OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTS, 1990, 13 (04) :255-270
[6]   General safety performance: A test of a grounded theoretical model [J].
Burke, MJ ;
Sarpy, SA ;
Tesluk, PE ;
Smith-Crowe, K .
PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY, 2002, 55 (02) :429-457
[7]   Potential difficulties in applying the Pay for Safety Scheme (PFSS) in construction projects [J].
Choi, Tracy N. Y. ;
Chan, Daniel W. M. ;
Chan, Albert P. C. .
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION, 2012, 48 :145-155
[8]   Perceived benefits of applying Pay for Safety Scheme (PFSS) in construction - A factor analysis approach [J].
Choi, Tracy N. Y. ;
Chan, Daniel W. M. ;
Chan, Albert P. C. .
SAFETY SCIENCE, 2011, 49 (06) :813-823
[9]   Measuring Safety Climate of a Construction Company [J].
Choudhry, Rafiq M. ;
Fang, Dongping ;
Lingard, Helen .
JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT, 2009, 135 (09) :890-899
[10]   Workplace Safety: A Meta-Analysis of the Roles of Person and Situation Factors [J].
Christian, Michael S. ;
Bradley, Jill C. ;
Wallace, J. Craig ;
Burke, Michael J. .
JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY, 2009, 94 (05) :1103-1127