On the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in group formation games

被引:9
作者
Hollard, G [1 ]
机构
[1] GREQAM, F-13002 Marseille, France
关键词
Nash equilibrium; potential games;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00193-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a class of games of group formation. The use of potentials allows for a characterization of such an equilibrium. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; D62; H73.
引用
收藏
页码:283 / 287
页数:5
相关论文
共 5 条
[1]   2ND BEST TAXATION AS A GAME [J].
GUESNERIE, R ;
ODDOU, C .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 25 (01) :67-91
[2]   Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry [J].
Konishi, H ;
LeBreton, M ;
Weber, S .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 72 (01) :225-237
[3]   Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions [J].
Milchtaich, I .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1996, 13 (01) :111-124
[4]  
Rosenthal RW, 1973, INT J GAME THEORY, V2, P65, DOI 10.1007/BF01737559
[5]  
VANMEGEN F, 1996, UNPUB STRONG NASH EQ