Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations

被引：4
作者：
Bloch, Francis [1 ]
Dutta, Bhaskar [2 ]
机构：
[1] Ecole Polytech, F-91128 Palaiseau, France
[2] Univ Warwick, Dept Econ, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2009年 / 66卷 / 02期
基金：
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词：
Correlated equilibrium; Coalitions; Information sharing; Games with positive externalities; EXTERNALITIES; CORE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：721 / 728
页数：8
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