Toward FPGA Security in IoT: A New Detection Technique for Hardware Trojans

被引:23
作者
Chen, Zhe [1 ]
Guo, Shize [1 ]
Wang, Jian [1 ]
Li, Yubai [1 ]
Lu, Zhonghai [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Elect Sci & Technol China, Sch Informat & Commun Engn, Chengdu 611731, Sichuan, Peoples R China
[2] KTH Royal Inst Technol, Sch Elect Engn & Comp Sci, S-16440 Stockholm, Sweden
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Electromagnetic (EM) side channel; field programmable gate array (FPGA); hardware Trojan (HT) detection; Internet of Things (IoT) security; INTERNET; THINGS;
D O I
10.1109/JIOT.2019.2914079
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Nowadays, field programmable gate array (FPGA) has been widely used in Internet of Things (IoT) since it can provide flexible and scalable solutions to various IoT requirements. Meanwhile, hardware Trojan (HT), which may lead to undesired chip function or leak sensitive information, has become a great challenge for FPGA security. Therefore, distinguishing the Trojan-infected FPGAs is quite crucial for reinforcing the security of IoT. To achieve this goal, we propose a clock-tree-concerned technique to detect the HTs on FPGA. First, we present an experimental framework which helps us to collect the electromagnetic (EM) radiation emitted by FPGA clock tree. Then, we propose a Trojan identifying approach which extracts the mathematical feature of obtained EM traces, i.e., 2-D principal component analysis (2DPCA) in this paper, and automatically isolates the Trojan-infected FPGAs from the Trojan-free ones by using a BP neural network. Finally, we perform extensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of our method. The results reveal that our approach is valid in detecting HTs on FPGA. Specifically, for the trust-hub benchmarks, we can find out the FPGA with always on Trojans (100% detection rate) while identifying the triggered Trojans with high probability (by up to 92%). In addition, we give a thorough discussion on how the experimental setup, such as probe step size, scanning area, and chip ambient temperature, affects the Trojan detection rate.
引用
收藏
页码:7061 / 7068
页数:8
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