Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion

被引：11
作者：
Traxler, Christian [1 ]
机构：
[1] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
来源：
PUBLIC CHOICE | 2009年 / 140卷 / 1-2期
关键词：
Majority voting; Tax evasion; Redistribution; UNDERGROUND ECONOMY; TAXABLE INCOME; TAXATION; REDISTRIBUTION; PROVISION;
D O I：
10.1007/s11127-009-9411-5
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich.
引用
收藏
页码：43 / 58
页数：16
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