Does feedback really matter in one-shot first-price auctions?

被引：9

作者：

Katuscak, Peter ^{[1
,2
]}

Michelucci, Fabio ^{[1
]}

Zajicek, Miroslav ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] CERGE EI, Prague 11000, Czech Republic

[2] Univ Econ Prague, Fac Econ, Dept Inst Environm & Expt Econ, Prague 13067 3, Czech Republic

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2015年 / 119卷

关键词：

Auctions; Feedback; Regret; Market design; INFORMATION FEEDBACK; REGRET; UNCERTAINTY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2015.08.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Does the type of posterior feedback affect how people decide in one-shot environments? We revisit this question in first-price auction markets. We consider three feedback types: minimal (only knowing whether winning or not), loser (also knowing the winning bid) and winner (knowing the second highest bid if winning). Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find that loser as opposed to minimal or winner feedback increases bids. We use three novel protocols and additionally replicate theirs. Using a sample of 624 subjects, we find that bidders' ex ante knowledge of posterior feedback type has no systematic effect on the average bid/value ratios. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：139 / 152

页数：14

共 23 条

[1] REGRET IN DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY [J].

BELL, DE .

OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1982, 30 (05) :961-981

[2] Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem? [J].

Blanco, Mariana ;

Engelmann, Dirk ;

Koch, Alexander K. ;

Normann, Hans-Theo .

EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2010, 13 (04) :412-438

[3] The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons [J].

Brandts, Jordi ;

Charness, Gary .

EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 14 (03) :375-398

[4] Why can't a woman bid more like a man? [J].

Chen, Yan ;

Katuscak, Peter ;

Ozdenoren, Emre .

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2013, 77 (01) :181-213

[5] Information disclosure in auctions: an experiment [J].

Dufwenberg, M ;

Gneezy, U .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2002, 48 (04) :431-444

[6] Regret and feedback information in first-price sealed-bid auctions [J].

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard ;

Katok, Elena .

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2008, 54 (04) :808-819

[7] THE EFFECT OF REGRET ON OPTIMAL BIDDING IN AUCTIONS [J].

ENGELBRECHTWIGGANS, R .

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1989, 35 (06) :685-692

[8] Auctions with anticipated regret: Theory and experiment [J].

Filiz-Ozbay, Emel ;

Ozbay, Erkut Y. .

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2007, 97 (04) :1407-1418

[9] z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments [J].

Fischbacher, Urs .

EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2007, 10 (02) :171-178

[10]

Greiner B, 2015, J ECON SCI ASSOC-JES, V1, P114, DOI 10.1007/s40881-015-0004-4

← 1 2 3 →