Does feedback really matter in one-shot first-price auctions?

被引：9

作者：

Katuscak, Peter ^{[1
,2
]}

Michelucci, Fabio ^{[1
]}

Zajicek, Miroslav ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] CERGE EI, Prague 11000, Czech Republic

[2] Univ Econ Prague, Fac Econ, Dept Inst Environm & Expt Econ, Prague 13067 3, Czech Republic

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2015年 / 119卷

关键词：

Auctions; Feedback; Regret; Market design; INFORMATION FEEDBACK; REGRET; UNCERTAINTY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2015.08.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Does the type of posterior feedback affect how people decide in one-shot environments? We revisit this question in first-price auction markets. We consider three feedback types: minimal (only knowing whether winning or not), loser (also knowing the winning bid) and winner (knowing the second highest bid if winning). Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find that loser as opposed to minimal or winner feedback increases bids. We use three novel protocols and additionally replicate theirs. Using a sample of 624 subjects, we find that bidders' ex ante knowledge of posterior feedback type has no systematic effect on the average bid/value ratios. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：139 / 152

页数：14

共 23 条

[1] REGRET IN DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
BELL, DE
[J]. OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1982, 30 (05) : 961 - 981
[2] Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem?
Blanco, Mariana
Engelmann, Dirk
Koch, Alexander K.
Normann, Hans-Theo
[J]. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2010, 13 (04) : 412 - 438
[3] The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons
Brandts, Jordi
Charness, Gary
[J]. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 14 (03) : 375 - 398
[4] Why can't a woman bid more like a man?
Chen, Yan
Katuscak, Peter
Ozdenoren, Emre
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2013, 77 (01) : 181 - 213
[5] Information disclosure in auctions: an experiment
Dufwenberg, M
Gneezy, U
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2002, 48 (04) : 431 - 444
[6] Regret and feedback information in first-price sealed-bid auctions
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
Katok, Elena
[J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2008, 54 (04) : 808 - 819
[7] THE EFFECT OF REGRET ON OPTIMAL BIDDING IN AUCTIONS
ENGELBRECHTWIGGANS, R
[J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1989, 35 (06) : 685 - 692
[8] Auctions with anticipated regret: Theory and experiment
Filiz-Ozbay, Emel
Ozbay, Erkut Y.
[J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2007, 97 (04) : 1407 - 1418
[9] z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
Fischbacher, Urs
[J]. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2007, 10 (02) : 171 - 178
[10] Greiner B, 2015, J ECON SCI ASSOC-JES, V1, P114, DOI 10.1007/s40881-015-0004-4

← 1 2 3 →