Effect of Security Investment on Evolutionary Games

被引：0
作者：
Zhang, Chen [1 ]
Pan, Rong [2 ]
Chaudhury, Abhijit [2 ]
Xu, Changxin [3 ]
机构：
[1] Bryant Univ, Dept Comp Informat Syst, Smithfield, RI USA
[2] China Construct Bank, Nanjing 2100002, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[3] Hohai Univ, Sch Business, Nanjing 210098, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF INFORMATION SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING | 2014年 / 30卷 / 06期
关键词：
management; network reliability; security; artificial intelligence; evolutionary algorithm; INFORMATION SECURITY; SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES; INTERNET SECURITY; MARKET; MODEL;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game model to analyze the investment decision making process in the cyber offender-defender interaction and provide a quantified approach for defender to calculate the safety threshold to avoid the occurrence of offender-leading game. Then we use simulation as a workbench to discuss the adjustment of each parameter to the security investment threshold. Our evolutionary game model shows that the cyber offender-defender game can possibly reach one realistic stable point after a long-term evolution, which implicates a tied offender-defender game. We found that an offender-leading game can be avoided by maintaining the security investment above a safety threshold level determined by the system vulnerability among other environmental parameters such as residual risk and potential loss. Hence with an optimal level of security investment, the defender can lead the game effectively to discourage attacking attempts. Both linear and nonlinear simulations share similar trends and our evolutionary game theoretic analysis remains valid in either case.
引用
收藏
页码：1695 / 1718
页数：24
相关论文
共 57 条
  • [11] Franklin J, 2007, CCS'07: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, P375
  • [12] EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN ECONOMICS
    FRIEDMAN, D
    [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1991, 59 (03) : 637 - 666
  • [13] The economic incentives for sharing security information
    Gal-Or, E
    Ghose, A
    [J]. INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH, 2005, 16 (02) : 186 - 208
  • [14] The potential for underinvestment in internet security: implications for regulatory policy
    Garcia, Alfredo
    Horowitz, Barry
    [J]. JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, 2007, 31 (01) : 37 - 55
  • [15] Information security: Why the future belongs to the quants
    Geer Jr., Daniel
    Hoo, Kevin Soo
    Jaquith, Andrew
    [J]. IEEE Security and Privacy, 2003, 1 (04) : 24 - 32
  • [16] Gordon L. A., 2002, ACM Transactions on Information and Systems Security, V5, P438, DOI 10.1145/581271.581274
  • [17] Gordon L.A., CSI FBI COMPUTER CRI
  • [18] Gordon L.A., 2003, COMPUTER SECURITY J, V19, P1
  • [19] Budgeting process for information security expenditures
    Gordon, LA
    Loeb, MP
    [J]. COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, 2006, 49 (01) : 121 - 125
  • [20] A framework for using insurance for cyber-risk management
    Gordon, LA
    Loeb, MP
    Sohail, T
    [J]. COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, 2003, 46 (03) : 81 - 85
123456