Catalytic finance: When does it work?

被引：70

作者：

Morris, Stephen

Shin, Hyun Song

机构：

[1] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England

[2] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 70卷 / 01期

基金：

英国经济与社会研究理事会;

关键词：

catalytic finance; IMF; debtor adjustment; moral hazard; sovereign debt;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.014

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.

引用

页码：161 / 177

页数：17

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